The postponement of the Constituent Assembly came as a shattering
disillusionment to the Awami League and their supporters throughout East
Pakistan. It was seen as a betrayal and as proof of the determination of
the army and of the West Pakistan authorities to deny them the fruits of
their electoral victory.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's reaction was to call a five-day general strike (hartal)
throughout East Pakistan. In a statement on 2 March, he said 'In this
critical hour it is the sacred duty of each and every Bengali in every
walk of life, including government employees, not to cooperate with
anti-people forces and instead to do everything in their power to foil
the conspiracy against Bangladesh'. The response was complete. Normal
life was paralysed. Transport and communications ceased. All factories,
offices and shops were closed. Any who attempted to open them were
roughly handled by Awami League vigilantes. The streets were filled with
marching, chanting, protesting processions.
At first the army tried to assert their authority and this resulted in
Dacca, Khulna, Jessore and elsewhere in a number of clashes between them
and demonstrators and looters, in which the army opened fire on unarmed
civilians. The Pakistan authorities later stated that a total of 172
persons had been killed in this period, but some of them were killed in
intercommunal clashes.
As from March 3, the army were ordered to return to their cantonments
and remained there until March 25. The Pakistan authorities say that
their purpose was to avoid further clashes during the period of
negotiation. Some have suggested that the army were holding their fire
until they were ready to strike, but this seems unlikely as few, if any,
units were flown into East Pakistan between 4 and 25 March. Whatever the
reason for the withdrawal, it had the effect of keeping down the
violence in a period of extreme tension.
Apart from some serious riots in Chittagong on and after the night of 3
March, and some less severe incidents on the same day at Jessore and
Khulna, there was remarkably little communal violence during the hartal.
The events at Chittagong on the night of 3/4 March are described as
follow in the Pakistan White Paper:
'At Chittagong, violent
mobs led by Awami League storm troopers attacked the Wireless Colony and
several other localities, committing wanton acts of loot, arson, killing
and rape. In one locality (Ferozeshah Colony), 700 houses were set on
fire and their inmates including men, women and children were burnt to
death. Those who tried to flee, were either killed or seriously wounded.
Apart from those burnt alive, whose bodies were found later, over 300
persons were killed or wounded on 3 and 4 March.'1
According to information received from foreign nationals in Chittagong,
which is believed to be reliable, the incident began when Bengali
demonstrators passed in procession through Bihari areas in order to make
the Biharis keep to the hartal. The demonstrators were fired upon by
Biharis, and a serious riot followed in which people were killed on both
sides and a substantial number of Bihari houses were burnt. The number
killed on both sides may have reached 200. It is to be noted that by
giving a joint estimate of 300 for killed and wounded, the White Paper
does not give any estimate of the number of deaths. The rioting
continued sporadically for a number of days until order was restored by
the Awami League on orders from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
On March 3, President Yahya Khan invited 121eaders of the main political
groups in the newly elected National Assembly to meet at Dacca on 10
March in an effort to solve the crisis. Sheikh Mujibur rejected the
invitation the same evening and started issuing a series of instructions
or' directives' to implement a' non-violent and non-cooperation movement
'. These included an injunction not to pay taxes.
At his press conference on 2 March, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stated that
the Awami League would hold a public meeting at Dacca on 7 March where
he would' outline a programme for achieving the right of
self-determination for the people of Bengal'.2 This phrase
was, of course, an allusion to the principle of self-determination of
peoples under the Charter of the United Nations. The general expectation
was that he would then declare the independence of Bangladesh. Perhaps
to avert this, President Yahya Khan in an address to the nation on 6
March announced that the National Assembly would meet on 25 March. He
added the warning:
'Let me make it
absolutely clear that no matter what happens, as long as I am in command
of the Pakistan Armed Forces and Head of the State, I will ensure
complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan. Let there be no mistake on
this point. I have a duty towards millions of people of East and West
Pakistan to preserve this country. They expect this from me and I shall
not fail them.'
On 7 March. Sheikh Mujibur replied by putting forward four demands which
had to be accepted before the Awami League would consider attending the
National Assembly. These were:
(I) immediate withdrawal of martial law;
(2) immediate withdrawal of alllnilitary personnel to their barracks ;
(3) an official enquiry into army killings in East Pakistan;
(4) immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the
people (i.e. before the National Assembly met).
A fifth demand was added later that reinforcements of army units from
West Pakistan must cease.
The first four demands were in effect a demand that President Yahya Khan
should accept the then status quo. According to the Awami League
representatives these demands were never in terms rejected. It was
clear, however, that for President Yahya Khan to have implemented
formally the first and fourth demands would have amounted to a complete
surrender. The second was already in force and the third was accepted in
principle, though agreement was never reached on the form of the
enquiry. The fifth demand, of course, was not accepted.
As from 7 March, the general strike was replaced by a 'return to normal.
under what amounted in fact, though not in name, to a provisional
government by the Awami League. The civil service, police. even the
judges acknowledged the authority of their' directives'. The new
governor, General Tikka Khan was unable at that time to find anyone
prepared to swear him into office. Gradually the shops, banks and
offices began to open again. Some acts of violence did of course occur
but, contrary to the contention of the Pakistan Government in their
White Paper3, the Awami League leaders were in general
successful in maintaining the non-violent character of the resistance.
Indeed, even in the White Paper the only killings alleged to have
occurred between 6 and 24 March were:
(a)
the killing of a demonstrator by a
shopkeeper whose shop was being attacked at Khulna on 6 March;
(b)
the killing of two escaping prisoners by
police at Comilla on 12 March, and
the killing of 3 people by the army when barricades were formed at
Joydevpur on 19 March. (At the time, Bengali police estimated that about
15 civilians were killed by the army in this incident.4)
Not a single person is alleged to have been killed by mobs or by
supporters of the Awami League between those dates.5
The Awami League leaders were determined to maintain the policy of
non-violence. Several incidents bear witness to this. It is reported
that order was restored in Chittagong at the beginning of March by a
Commission sent from Dacca. In mid-March some young Awami League
supporters set up check-points on the approaches to Dacca airport in
order to search fugitives to West Pakistan to see that they were not
taking large sums of money or jewelry with them. This led to one case of
violence with the victim being taken to hospital. The check-points were
dismantled on personal orders from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami
League leaders knew they had nothing to gain and everything to lose from
violence, as it could only lead to severe repression by the army. There
is no doubt that they were remarkably successful in this. The Anglican
Bishop of Dacca gives the following description, which tallies with many
other similar reports:
'I left Dacca by road at
5.30 a.m. on March I, and travelled safely and uneventfully to Khulna.
That evening I learnt on the wireless that there had been some
hooliganism in Dacca and several non-Bengali shops had been looted, but
that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had used his personal influence to stop the
trouble. I also heard that on Monday there was to be a 'hartal' in
Dacca, and on Tuesday there was to be a three day 'hartal' throughout
the province. On the Monday I travelled some 70 miles safely and
uneventfully. During the 'hartal' my car was taken back to Dacca with
two Scottish visitors, and took two days for the journey, because the 'hartal'
only stopped at 2.00 p.m. each day. They arrived in Dacca safely and
uneventfully. Thereafter up till the 17th March I was travelling by
train, road and river, passing through six districts, and I travelled in
the utmost peace and security. None of the people whom I spoke to on my
way seemed to have any anxiety about the situation.
There was, it is true, a
non-cooperation movement going on at the time. ...It could be said that
the de facto government of the country was then in the hands of Sheikh
Mujibur. But to speak of a break-down of law and order is a great
exaggeration. There was both law and order. The non-cooperation, apart
from the one incident in Dacca mentioned above, was being strictly
non-violent. ...'
We do not suggest that there were no other acts of violence during this
period. There is evidence to show that attacks were made on non-Bengalis
in Rangpur during the week ending March 13, and at Saidpur on March 24,
during which shops and properties were burnt and a number of people
killed. But considering the state of tension which prevailed, the extent
of the violence was surprisingly restricted. Students and Awami League
supporters were, however, preparing themselves for an eventual armed
conflict. Many accounts have been given on the Pakistani side of looting
of arms and ammunition and preparation of petrol and hand-made bombs
manufactured from stolen chemicals. While the army remained in their
cantonments, they were subjected to a blockade by Awami League
supporters, so that fresh rations and other civilian supplies were
prevented from reaching them. This action added to the fury of the army
attack when it came.
On March 15 President Yahya Khan flew again to Dacca to hold
constitutional talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Leaders of various West
Pakistan parties arrived later in Dacca to join ill the talks. The
Pakistan Government's version of these talks is given in their White
Paper.6
The Bangladesh Government have not yet published an official account of
the negotiations. The fullest account has been given by Mr. Rehman
Sobhan, an adviser to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on constitutional and
economic policy.7
According to the Pakistan White Paper, by 20 March President Yahya Khan
had provisionally agreed to make a proclamation providing for an interim
constitution until a new constitution had been drawn up by the National
Assembly. Under the interim constitution, Yahya Khan was to continue as
President and Head of State under the 1962 Constitution with a Cabinet
of Ministers selected from representatives of the political parties of
East and West Pakistan; the powers of the central legislature were to be
as provided in the 1962 Constitution save for' certain limitations and
modifications to be agreed upon with respect to the Province of East
Pakistan' ; Provincial Governors were to be appointed by the President
and Provisional Cabinets appointed from the members of the Provincial or
National Assemblies to aid and advise the Governors; martial law was to
be revoked as from the day the Provincial Cabinets took office, but if
ever it appeared to the President that a situation had arisen in which
the government of a province could not be carried on, the President was
to be able to assume to himself the executive government of the
province. All this was to be subject to the agreement of other political
leaders and to the 'all-important question of legal validity '. This
referred to an objection raised by President Yahya Khan's advisers that
if martial law was revoked, the instrument establishing the Central and
Provisional Government would have no legal validity; 'a constitutional
vacuum would therefore be created in the country '. Considering the
number of constitutional irregularities which had already occurred in
the short history of the state of Pakistan8, this objection
showed a surprising degree of constitutional sensitivity. Mujibur
Rahman's legal expert, Dr. Kamal Hossein,9 was convinced that
there was no validity in the objection. He suggested, and it was agreed,
that the opinion should be sought of the leading Pakistan constitutional
lawyer, Mr. A. K. Brohi10. Mr. Brohi's opinion supported the
view of the Awami League that the objection was invalid. He advised that
a precedent was to be found in the method of transferring power from the
British Government at the time of Independence. According to the Awami
League representatives, this opinion was accepted by President Yahya
Khan and his legal adviser, ex-Chief Justice Cornelius, 'and it
disappeared from the dialogues at an early stage.'11
The unexpected degree of progress which had been made in the talks led
President Yahya Khan to call Mr. Bhutto to Dacca, where he arrived with
his aides on 21 March. It was soon evident that there was no area of
agreement between him and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He insisted that
martial law should be retained until the new constitution was in force,
and, in order to prevent the exercise by the Awami League of what he
termed their 'brute majority', he maintained that no law or constitution
should be able to be presented in the National Assembly unless approved
by a majority of the members of each wing, and any constitution approved
by the National Assembly should still be subject to the Presidential
veto under the Legal Framework Order.2 It may be assumed that Mr.
Bhutto's objection was to ensure that there was no lawful way in which
East Bengal could obtain their economic independence, still less their
political independence.
The 23rd March was 'Pakistan Day', and was provocatively declared in
Dacca to be 'Resistance Day'. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman took the salute at
an armed march past from his residence, from which the new Bangladesh
flag was unfurled. This flag was flown from hundreds of public and
private buildings all over the country. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman issued a
'declaration of emancipation'.
On the same day his representatives produced to the President's advisers
a draft proclamation going well beyond the proposals which appeared to
have been provisionally agreed three days earlier and, in one important
respect beyond even the Six Points. The Awami League draft, which is set
out in full as an appendix to the White Paper 13 provided for:
1.
martial law to stand revoked in a province
from the day when the Provincial Governor (who was to be irremovable)
took office, and in any event within seven days of the proclamation;
2.
members of the National Assembly from' the
State of Bangladesh , were to sit as a separate Constituent Convention
to frame a constitution for the State of Bangladesh within 45 days, and
members from the States of West Pakistan (Punjab, Sind, North-West
Frontier Province and Balukistan) were to do likewise for a constitution
for the States of West Pakistan;
3. the
National Assembly was then to 'sit together as a sovereign body for the
purpose of framing a constitution for the Confederation of Pakistan'
(not, as in the Six Points, a Federation), and the President was to be
deprived of the power of veto which he had reserved for himself under
the Legal Framework Order;
4.
the provincial government and legislature
of East Pakistan were to have substantially increased powers during the
interim period, including foreign trade and aid, control of finance and
taxation and control of their own state bank.
On the face of them, these provisions would have ensured complete
freedom for East Pakistan to determine its own destiny, and also
complete control over the central constitution-making process and the
central government. In view of the use which was subsequently made of
this draft in justification of the army's action, the Awami League's
account of how this document came to be prepared is of importance.
When by March 20 a fair amount of agreement seemed to have been reached
on an interim constitution, the Awami League representatives urged
President Yahya Khan to bring over a statutory draftsman to draw up the
necessary proclamation. President Yahya Khan kept pressing the Awami
League to produce their own draft. Unwisely perhaps, they eventually
agreed to do so. In the circumstances, and with no agreement secured
from Mr. Bhutto, the Awami League could hardly have been expected to
draft a compromise proposal. Their draft (which appears to have been
based on their draft constitution prepared for submission to the
Constituent Assembly) expresses their negotiating position. They claim
that they put it forward, not in the belief that it would be accepted in
full, but expecting it to lead to more specific negotiations. Moreover,
they contend that at no stage were their proposals rejected by President
Yahya Khan, who kept referring matters for discussion by the expert
advisers on both sides. The Awami League representatives are now
convinced that President Yahya Khan never had any intention of reaching
an agreement with the Awami League, and was merely playing for time.
Others believe that President Yahya Khan would, for his part, have been
ready to accept an accommodation with the Awami League but that
agreement could not be achieved with Mr. Bhutto. For example, the Times
correspondent, Mr. Peter Hazelhurst has written:
'It was Bhutto who
finally brought the President to take the decision which set East Bengal
on fire. When the President put the Sheikh's proposal to the West
Pakistan leaders, Bhutto pointed out that if the Martial Law was
withdrawn, Pakistan would be broken up into five sovereign States, the
moment the President restored the power to the Provinces. He expressed
the fear that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was trying to liquidate the Central
Government, because when the President withdrew the Martial Law, he had
no sanction to carryon as Head of the State. Half-convinced, the
President went back to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and expressed these fears.
He promised Mujib that he would withdraw the Martial Law the moment the
National Assembly met and gave the Central Government some form of
validity. Sheikh Mujib reiterated his demand for the immediate
withdrawal of the Martial Law.'14
According to the White Paper, the talks broke down because the Awarni
League representatives were not prepared to compromise on the essential
features of their proposed proclamation15, and because their
proposals were unacceptable to Mr. Bhutto or to the other party leaders
from West Pakistan, or to President Yahya Khan and the army.16
It is impossible to reconcile the accounts given by the two sides.
Wherever the truth lies, it can be said that the Awami League believed
that the election results, coupled with the complete support they had
received from the people and all organs of government in East Pakistan
since 2 March, entitled them to the degree of autonomy which they had
claimed in the Six Points. When that was finally refused to them, they
considered that they were entitled to claim the independence of
Bangladesh in accordance with the principle of the right of
self-determination. The justification for this claim in international
law will be considered later.17 To President Yahya Khan and
to the other army leaders, the claim to autonomy and the conduct of the
Awami League appeared as treason. By 25 March the President had
evidently concluded that no negotiated settlement was possible. There
was no need to protract the fruitless constitutional negotiations any
further. The army's contingency plans were brought into force. It
struck, and struck with terrifying brutality.
The White Paper asserts that reports had become available of Awami
League plans to launch an armed rebellion in the early hours of 26
March, and puts this forward as the explanation and justification of the
army's action.18 According to the White Paper the operational plan was
as follows:
-
East Bengali Regiment troops would occupy Dacca and
Chittagong to prevent the landing of Pakistan Army reinforcements by
air or sea;
-
the remaining East Bengali troops with the help of the
East Pakistan Rifles and the police would move to eliminate the Armed
Forces at various cantonments and stations;
-
the East Pakistan Regiment would occupy border posts to
keep it open for aid, arms and ammunition from India;
-
Indian troops would come to the assistance of the Awami League once
the latter succeeded in occupying the key centres and paralysing the
Pakistani army.
The
source of this information is not given, but it seems inherently
probable, as well as being consistent with subsequent events, that there
would have been a contingency plan of this nature. It must have been
evident to all concerned that if the political talks broke down, the
army would leave their cantonments and use force to restore the
authority of the martial law regime and bring the' non-cooperation
movement' to an end. The only alternative to surrender would then be
armed resistance. Reports that the talks were foundering was common
knowledge by the evening of March 24 and this resulted in outbreaks of
violence in a number of centres on 25 March.
We
do not feel able to accept that the army's action was caused by a
discovery of an Awami League plan to launch an armed rebellion. Rather,
it was caused by President Yahya Khan's decision to break off further
negotiations and reassert his authority. The nature of the action taken
was, however, influenced by the knowledge that it would convert the
hitherto passive resistance into an armed resistance by defecting East
Bengali troops and police and by those Awami League supporters and
students who had succeeded in collecting arms.
The
White Paper also asserts that' the action of the Federal Government on
25 March, 1971, was designed to restore law and order, which had broken
down completely during the period of the Awami League's 'non-violent,
non-cooperation' movement'.19 As has been seen, the charge
that there had been a complete breakdown of law and order is not
justified, at least up to 24 March. The break-down in law and order
which then occurred was a consequence of the breakdown in talks, of the
decision to reassert the authority of the army and of the armed
resistance to that decision.
Footnotes:
1The
Crisis in East Pakistan, Government of Pakistan, 5 August, 1971, p. 31.
2Washington
Post, 3 March 1971.
3Op.
cit.,
p. 15.
4Martin
Adeney, Venture, Vol. 23, No.5, p. 9, Fabian Society. London.
5Op.
cit.,
pp. 32-38.
6Op.
cit., pp. 16-27.
7Negotiating
for Bangladesh: A Participant's View. Sobhan, R. July 1971, South Asian
Review, Vol. 4, No.4, p. 315.
8See
Part III below.
9Now
Minister for Law in the Bangladesh Cabinet.
10Mr.
Brohi later defended Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at his secret trial before a
military tribunal after his arrest.
11Sobhan,
R., op. cit., p. 323.
12The
Crisis in East Pakistan, op. cit., p. 21.
13Op.
cit.,
pp. 47-59.
14Peter
Hazelhurst The Times, London, June 4, 1971.
15Op.
cit., pp. 25 and 26.
16The
Awami League representatives assert that this was not suggested to them,
even at this late stage. It now seems clear that the decision to break
off the negotiations and to start the army 'crack-down' must have been
taken at the latest on March 24. However, at a further meeting on the
evening of that day, President Yahya Khan's advisers did not reject the
proposals and agreed to telephone Dr. Kamal Hossein next morning with a
view to arranging a further meeting on the next day to discuss its
terms. This was the telephone call which never came.'
17See Part V below.
18Op. cit., p. 27. The alleged operational plan is set out on p. 40.
19Op.
cit., Introduction.